Clear-Hold-Build

Objective of CHB

- Create a secure physical and psychological environment.
- Establish firm government control of the populace and area.
- Gain the populace's support.

FM 3-24, Ch. 5, p. 18

NOT

Clear
then
Hold
then
Build

BUT

Clear
and
Hold
and
Build

Preparing for Clear-Hold-Build

Planning, training, organizing, and equipping both civil and military forces

Prepare to build so that you don't have to re-clear.

Typical preparatory activities:

- Assess the environment
- Conduct overall planning
- Assign responsibilities to civil and military elements
- Conduct joint/combined training and rehearsals
- Begin Information Engagement (IE) operations
- Establish way-stations for basic services to civilians being displaced

Ramadi: June 2006–March 2007

AO Topeka

Ready First Combat Team (RFCT)

Ramadi: June 2006

- Most violent city in Iraq per capita
- Up to 50 attacks/day
- Less than 100 police report to work in city of 400,000
- Most of downtown firmly under AQIZ control

"The chief of intelligence for the Marine Corps in Iraq recently filed an unusual secret report concluding that the prospects for securing that country's western Anbar province are dim and that there is almost nothing the U.S. military can do to improve the political and social situation there."

–Washington Post, 11 Sep 06

Tribal Cooperation, Jun 2006



	JUN06
UN-COOPERATIVE	12
NEUTRAL	3
COOPERATIVE	6

Initial ISF Set: June 2006



IP	IA	ERU	PROV
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Information Engagement

	Clear	Hold	Build
Population	Gain & maintain overt support for COIN ops	Emphasize commitment to persistent security	Highlight legitimacy, unity, cooperation
Insurgents	Convince them they cannot win, should surrender	Encourage them to surrender or leave	Highlight insurgent failures, create divisions
Counter-insurgents		Emphasize changed mission, measured force	Inform on new ROEs, encourage vigilance
Regional, Int'l		Emphasize commitment to persistent security	

FM 3-24, Ch. 5, p. 18–22

Changing the Narrative

"We took a different IO tack with the sheiks. Instead of telling them that we would leave soon and they must assume responsibility for their own security, we told them that we would stay as long as necessary to defeat the terrorists. That was the message they had been waiting to hear. As long as they perceived us as mere interlopers, they dared not throw in their lot with ours. When they began to think of us as reliable partners, their attitudes began to change. Still, we had to prove that we meant what we were saying."

–COL Sean MacFarland, *Military Review,* March–Apr 2007

Force and Capacity



Clear

Priority

Offense	Defense	Stability
•Cordon and Search •Raid/Attack •Recon/Site Exploitation •Strike Operations •Movement to contact •Information Engagement	•Block Axis Routes •Establish COPs •Protect Civilians •Sniper Operations	•Essential Services IDP way-station •Establish Casualty Collection Points

"This operation's purpose is to disrupt insurgent forces and force a reaction by major insurgent elements in the area…. These offensive operations are only the beginning, not the end state. Eliminating insurgent forces does not remove the entrenched insurgent infrastructure."

FM 3-24, Ch. 5, p. 19

Decisive Operations: Overview



We know HOW to build a combat outpost, but do we know WHERE or WHEN?

Hold

Priority

Offense	Defense	Stability
•Raids (Leadership, Auxiliary and Underground) •Ambush (Guerrillas entering cleared area) •Strike Operations	•Block axis routes/ in-process civilians •Traffic Control Points (Searches/ID checks) •Presence patrols •Sniper Operations •Improve COPs •Curfews •Cordon and Knock •Information Engagement	•Reassess Root Causes •Address immediate problems/essential services •Conduct Populace and Resource Control •Negotiate with local leaders for Build Stage

"Ideally, HN forces execute this part of the clear-hold-build approach." FM 3-24, Ch. 5, p. 19

Holding Ramadi

- Combat Outpost Expansion x20
- IP Recruitment and Training
- Tribal Alliances
- Interruption of insurgent networks
- Targeted CMO
- Census Ops

"A power struggle has erupted: al-Qaeda's reign of terror is being challenged. Sheikh Sittar and many of his fellow tribal leaders have cast their lot with the once-reviled U.S. military. They are persuading hundreds of their followers to sign up for the previously defunct Iraqi police. American troops are moving into a city that was, until recently, a virtual no-go area. A battle is raging for the allegiance of Ramadi's battered and terrified citizens and the outcome could have far-reaching consequences."

- *The London Times* 20 November 2006

Population Control

"Population control includes determining who lives in an area and what they do."

FM 3-24, Ch. 5, p. 21

- **Required to separate insurgents from the popula**
- Many tools:
  - Census
  - ID cards
  - Biometrics
  - Vehicle registratio
  - Curfews
  - Food control
  - Control of movement

Build

Priority

Offense	Defense	Stability
•Provide QRF •Dismounted foot patrols	•Protect population •Protect Infrastructure and reconstruction projects •Presence patrols •Improve COPs •Curfews •Cordon and Knock	•Promote political, social, and economic reforms and development •Promote mobilization of local workforce and local materials •Conduct Populace and Resource Control •Negotiate with local leaders for Build Stage •Training Civil Defense Forces •Information Engagement

Human *and* Physical Infrastructure

- Human infrastructure is more critical than physical – mentor local leaders
- Good governance matters
- Help and protect those that help you

So, Does It Work?

HN Police in Ramadi

"[COL MacFarland] agreed to set up police stations in their areas, but only if the sheiks would provide 100 men to serve as police elsewhere in the city. Last year there were roughly 100 police patrolling Ramadi. Now there are about 4,000. And where there were once 4 outposts, there are 24, where Americans and Iraqis live together."

– NPR *All Things Considered*, 22 Feb 07

Insurgent Groups: AO Topeka

JUNE 06



MARCH 07



Insurgent Attack Trends: AO Topeka

- **Iraq Study Group: situation "grave and deteriorating"; conditions in Ramadi indicated otherwise**
- **Direct contact/complex attack capability was dwindling**
- **Highest casualty-producing weapons remained IEDs, although catastrophic at times, they were mostly ineffective.**

INDIRECT FIRE ATTACKS



DOWN 67%

IED ATTACKS



DOWN 57%

DAILY ATTACK AVERAGES



DOWN 38%

MAXIMUM # FIGHTERS PER COMPLEX ATTACK



DOWN 40%

RFCT Cache Finds: As of 12 Feb 2007

Removing the Threat Before It Can Be Used

- **Iraqi Police (IP) knew what to look for when searching for caches**
- **Locals shared information more readily with IP**
- **Informants were not marked as collaborators for talking to IP**
- **Untrained IP investigation more effective d**
- **language/custom barrier**



Tribal Cooperation, Jun 2006



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Tribal Cooperation, Jan 2007

Sheikh Albu Ali Jasim Murdered by AQIZ 21 AUG 06

Tribes turn on AQIZ
Local nationals start killing known terrorists on our targ[illegible]ists

Al Anbar Awakening
50 Sheikhs – Tribal Council
First OBJ = Defeat AQIZ
2nd = Work in Rule of Law
Provide 90+ % IP Recruits

Albu Soda Fight
Sheikh Jasim Mohammed
Stops all IDF on Corregidor
AQIZ attacked on 25NOV06

ALBU ASSAF
ALBU ALI JASSIM
ALBU THIYAB
ALBU AETHA
ALBU FAHAD
ALBU OBAID
ALBU RISHA
SHABAN
JANABI
SODA
MAHAL
RUBAIT
CHILIBAWI
ALBU FARAJ
HAIABSA
TAHA
HAZIM
FADHAWAI
BALI
KALIFAH
GHANAM
ALBU AJUR
TAHA
ALWAN
ALBU ALWAN
MAWRI
ALBU HAZIM
ALBU FAHAD
SHBAYL
ALBU AJUR
HUSAYN
THALAL
MIXED
MIXED
LAKE HABBANIYAH
ALBU JABBAR
ALBU SHILB, JULIB
ALBU THIYAB
ALBU MARA

	JUN06	DEC06
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Initial ISF Set: June 2006



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Outposts: February 2007



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Conclusion

“This is news the world doesn't hear: Ramadi, long a hotbed of unrest, a city that once formed the southwestern tip of the notorious "Sunni Triangle," is now telling a different story, a story of Americans who came here as liberators, became hated occupiers and are now the protectors of Iraqi reconstruction.”

— *Der Spiegel*, 10 August 2007

Questions?

Engaging HNSF

Tactical Decision Game

Scenario

Your unit has just moved into its AO; the previous unit did not have an effective working relationship with local HNSF. You know some of the HNSF are involved with insurgents and/or militias In one month, your unit will conduct CHB operations. What is your plan for motivating the HNSF and gaining trust before these operations begin?

Solution #1

Solution #2

Case Study: Tal Afar

"To win in counterinsurgency, the local population must execute the long-term answer; our role is to set conditions that allow Iraqis to independently succeed … we set conditions for the return of ISF, who were fearful of operating in a dangerous neighborhood, which, in turn, set conditions for the return of displaced residents. The continued peace [in Tal Afar] is a testament to what ISF can do when U.S. forces serve in a committed support role."

- Company Commander, Tal Afar, Iraq, 2006